foto: Redakce SM/Jaromír Zůna, minister of defense
Shortly after Jaromír Zůna assumed the role of Minister of Defense, Security Magazine secured an exclusive interview with him to discuss his initial steps and the new ministry leadership's key priorities.
The government's policy statement emphasizes building a professional and technologically advanced army. What initial steps are you planning in this direction?
The first step, as outlined in the policy statement, is to update the Concept for the Development of the Czech Armed Forces (KVAČR). The question is whether to merely revise the current 2023 version or to develop an entirely new one as part of the regular cycle. I believe the latter is more likely.
During pre-election debates, politicians often argued: "We do have the Concept for the Development of the Czech Armed Forces at the Ministry of Defense—it's right here." But no one mentioned that the Defense Committee refused to take note of it. Unusually—even in the historical context of such documents—the previous Minister of Defense distanced himself from it, saying: "Contact the Chief of the General Staff; this is an army document." It is not. It is the minister's document, submitted to the government, and it is required by law.
What criticisms do you have of the current version? What is missing that should be included?
Many in the security community have called this third Concept for the Development of the Czech Armed Forces—presented by the army—a "fairy tale." It is very general and strongly resembles the 2008 concept. Even the Chief of the General Staff, despite its adoption in December 2023, stated at a commanders' meeting in February 2024 that the Czech Army's personnel model is unsustainable. He noted that, with the planned new NATO Capability Targets, the army would need an additional 7,500 soldiers, and that some form of compulsory military service would be unavoidable. Yet none of this is addressed in the concept.
These omissions alone mean the current document fails to align with the state's evolving security needs or provide realistic, up-to-date content.
Something similar has only happened once before, in 2009, when Defense Minister Barták canceled discussion of the Concept at a commanders' meeting. These are the only two such cases in the last 25 years. I remember this detail vividly because, 25 years ago, as part of the army professionalization project, I reminded then-Minister of Defense Tvrdík in my own concept that the defense department had 3,500 doctrinal documents and regulations whose preambles still referenced the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. With our NATO accession, we needed to completely overhaul this architecture and hierarchy of conceptual documents.
I proposed creating dedicated capacity for this, leading to the establishment of the Training and Doctrine Command in Vyškov. A doctrinal unit was set up there and successfully resolved the issue, though it took years. Doctrine has been my area of expertise—one I have long specialized in. I also spent two years at the U.S. Training and Doctrine Command, which employs about 60,000 people, centralizes all schools, and develops concepts, regulations, doctrines, visions, and strategies for ground forces, to which other armed forces components must adapt.
This is my field; I follow it closely and can engage deeply at any time. That's why I know that the current concept lacks consensus, realism, and resolution of the fundamental equation: the purpose, type, and size of the armed forces. In the new concept, we must address these core questions and translate them into practical reality—focusing on "how" rather than mere vision. A concept must be highly practical, with no room for philosophizing. Every sentence must be justified, every task measurable and achievable. This requires a fresh perspective, which is key.
Another critical issue—rarely discussed in our media—is how today's situation echoes the years around 2000–2002. Back then, after joining NATO in 1999 (during its 50th anniversary, the Yugoslavia bombing, and a shift to capability-based planning), we faced a vast array of new requirements from membership, integration, and interoperability. It became clear these could not fit within the existing army structure. The solution was systemic change: transitioning to a professional army.
Today, it's similar. We face evolving security needs, a deteriorating environment, new NATO requirements (including spending targets), enormous Alliance pressure for Europe to assume more responsibility, and new Capability Targets adopted in The Hague.
All this simply does not fit into the current army or ministry structure. This is truly my expertise: force and army development. When the Chief of the General Staff said in February 2024 that he needed 7,500 more soldiers (bringing the total to 37,500), I quickly ran the numbers and calculated that, for the Ministry of Defense, this would mean 43,000–45,000 personnel, depending on the approach. And today, we know that's accurate.
Is this solvable?
Yes, it is. We are in an era demanding systemic change, but the current KVAČR does not provide it. Therefore, we need a new concept that reflects this change. I'm personally very eager to tackle it. To that end, we have a meeting scheduled at the General Staff with the President on Wednesday, December 17, to discuss these issues. It will be challenging—I know from 25 years ago how difficult it was. There is broad agreement, but the challenge lies in making it socially and economically acceptable while meeting the country's security needs. I'm truly looking forward to it; these are the phases of military development where I feel most at home, drawing on my extensive conceptual, theoretical, and practical experience.
Why prioritize personnel—soldiers above all—and modernization with technology? We must shift to a new development model: replacing manpower with technology. Where we currently need three crews and three systems, modernization will allow one advanced system with equivalent capabilities but a single crew. Such technology exists; we just need to integrate it into our concepts and plans.
Second, demographic realities make personnel goals harder to achieve. In 2002, during professionalization, we had 1.4 million people aged 18–24 available. Today, that's only 800,000—and they are in poorer physical condition.
This means working with people will be entirely different. Conceptual solutions exist from the past, but with the full transition to a professional army, they've faded from collective memory, even in the security community. I won't preempt our final agreements, but I have clear ideas for realistic human resource strategies. It will involve a package of measures: engaging the public, creating opportunities for involvement in defense and security activities, and integrating these into the broader system.
The same applies to the defense industry. Our 2019 armament concept is outdated given today's realities. We need a new strategy elevating the relationship from "we know each other but operate separately" to "shared responsibility"—making the defense and security industry integral to the state's security system.
How can this be achieved, and why is it important?
In my previous role as the Ministry of Defense's property manager—overseeing all support and acquisitions—I attended industry associations, annual meetings, and events despite restrictions. When asked, I always said: "In America, they taught me differently. Period." And no one argued further. Why? Because at strategic schools, you study the defense industry: visiting major corporations, receiving briefings and training. There's nothing wrong with that.
Historically, only open, transparent communication has worked. That's our approach here. As minister, I will personally engage in developing the new concept—not just submit it to the government. We will create a long-term defense outlook to 2040, providing a mandate for the KVAČR.
We will support the Chamber of Commerce in drafting a new bill on government-to-government (G2G) trade in defense cooperation. This aims to boost Czech defense industry exports through legislative changes enabling foreign military equipment trade under G2G regimes, with Czech entities as implementers. We'll see how far we get.
We also want to support the Chamber in legitimizing these activities while backing our defense industry. Additionally, we'll collaborate on a new strategy for its development, replacing the outdated 2019 concept. These measures focus on equal opportunities and transparency for effective, well-justified spending—ensuring defense funds quickly enhance the army's combat value and readiness.
You mentioned cooperation with the Chamber of Commerce. Will the Defense and Security Industry Association (AOBP) also play a role?
Absolutely. We already cooperate with the Association and will expand it, given the massive funds flowing into defense and security. We need effective tools for their use.
Consider the state final accounts for 2022–2024: defense spending never exceeded 2% of GDP—always below. This isn't about competition but meaningful budget use to strengthen Czech defense and security.
We also recognize growing internal security importance. With insights into post-Ukraine conflict developments in Europe and other risks—new operational domains and areas—we'll cooperate with other state security components to institutionalize and bolster the overall system.
What steps are needed for better coordination between the army and other security forces?
Cooperation is essential. Several projects are underway, now discussed with new ministers. One example: joint recruitment and training centers for the security system, preventing components from competing for personnel. These centers would represent all forces, share resources, and build capacities for active reserves, facilities, and equipment.
The overall goal is to build on existing armed forces progress. My colleagues would agree: at General Staff meetings, even as an officer, I often said, "Let's praise ourselves sometimes—we do many things well." Our society is overwhelmed by criticism, but much has been achieved. Ten years after NATO accession, we had the best-transformed army among former post-communist countries. We led thanks to early professionalization and qualitative change—though we never fully implemented mobilization aspects, which were seen as key deterrents even then. Funding shortages shifted focus to expeditionary capabilities after 2008.
The current coalition has long called for auditing defense contracts, reviewing the Czech ammunition initiative, and increasing transparency. Does this remain a priority?
Yes, the intention remains. But I cannot answer your question about the technical aspects and implementation at this time. Objectively speaking, because it has to be planned, resources have to be allocated for it. And if something like this is launched, it has to be brought to some kind of conclusion. It will be a challenging task. Yes, the task remains, and you will be kept informed about how it will proceed. Some things have a transnational dimension. These include certain acquisitions and the aforementioned ammunition initiative. This makes it even more complicated. It is easy to audit an office where the only reported activity is official business. That means counting how many people are there, how much it costs, what the outputs are, and so on. In the case of defense, everyone understands that it is very complex. Very complex.
The policy statement calls for greater efficiency, economy, and transparency in procurement, including a shift in G2G approaches. Will competitive bidding be emphasized more?
Definitely—greater pressure to prioritize open competition over direct awards or G2G. But distinctions matter: strategic contracts (like infantry fighting vehicles) differ from routine troop support. It depends on category—strategic, significant, or operational. This systemic approach stabilizes defense management processes, which are currently unstable due to objective Alliance pressures and subjective priorities.
For instance, Alliance demands postponed conceptually planned systems for the heavy brigade due to geopolitical decisions. We must reset acquisition priorities aligned with budgets—we'll finalize this quickly in government.
Some voices suggest that, as a non-partisan expert minister, you may lack strong political backing for negotiating more defense funding. Do you feel supported by government colleagues and parties?
I am also Deputy Prime Minister. The government decides collectively, led by the Prime Minister, who resolves differing views in coalition talks. I do not see my position as weak.
Do you feel supported?
Absolutely. Absolutely.
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